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Abstract
The predictions that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption have
not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work
reviews this relationship by using firms’ data in a cross-country survey and ar-
gues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain
it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic
freedom-corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyze
this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of eco-
nomic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show
that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for
corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can ex-
plain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more
corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our
conjectures.
JEL : H10; H11; H50; K20; O5
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1. Introduction
The failure of markets is a classic justification for government intervention in
the economy. In reality, governments often intervene in markets that are not at all
affected by failure or imperfections. Misguided government policies interfering with
efficient markets have been a central concern to economists for a long time and great
efforts have been made to document that the effects of the excess of regulation may
cause the seeking of privileges, the hampering of free private entrepreneurial activity
and dejection in international exchanges. This means that diminishing these effects
should be sufficient to shrink government intervention.
This perspective is also extended for corruption phenomena. As argued by
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), government intervention transfers resources to the
private sphere creating room for corruption. This view also sustains that ”exten-
sions of privatization and market competition are an effective cure for a corrupt
state”. On the other hand, as noted by Hodgson and Jiang (2007), corruption may
be the reason why market failure exists. Interests of powerful sectoral lobbies can
lead policy makers into inefficient actions or make them unresponsive to specific
requests to regulate sectors.
In this line of research, much attention has been recently devoted to testing the
relationship between economic freedom and corruption under the predictions that
economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption. We follow the suggestions
originally developed with microdata (firms) in mind by Milgron and Roberts (1992)
and propose, as explanatory keys, firms’ vector indices of economic freedom linked
with corruption. We can justify our empirical choice because some components of
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economic freedom have a marked microfounded relationship with bribe phenomena
in economic activities.
Our research is related to a number of empirical papers that test whether more
freedom lowers corruption, implying that economic freedom acts as corruption de-
terrent (Chafuen and Guzma`n, 2000; Paldam, 2002). Our work is closest in spirit
to Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), who consider how specific components of economic
freedom affect corruption. Furthermore, we find inspiration from a large literature on
corruption that undermines the strength of public institutions and hampers economic
growth and development (and vice-versa). Classical references include Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Bardhan (1997) and Meon and Sekkat (2005). Our
work is also related to the empirical analyses that use microdata to investigate the
determinants of corruption (Swamy et al., 2001; Svensson, 2003; Mocan, 2008). Fi-
nally, we refer to the works of Hodgson (2006) and Hodgson and Jiang (2007) that
extend the role of corruption to the private sector and justify the extensive unsuc-
cessful privatization and the market competition in affecting corruption.
We motivate our analysis by observing conflicting empirical evidence of the hypo-
thesis that more economic freedom reduces corruption, irrespective of the fact that
economic freedom is used as an aggregate indicator, subdivided by its components
or tested for subsamples of countries. Billger and Goel (2009) show that, among
the most corrupt nations, greater economic freedom does not appear to cut corrup-
tion. Rather, it may exacerbate corruption issues indicating that nations respond
differently to levels of economic freedom because their dimension is associated with
country’s developing conditions. Serra (2006) identifies these factors by indicators
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of economic prosperity and democracy. Furthermore, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003)
arguing against the use of an aggregate indicator to evaluate their effects provide
support for a counter-intuitive effect of the size of government on corruption. Fi-
nally, it is generally argued that corruption differs across ”regulated” and ”freedom”
countries given the possible non-linearities between corruption and its causes. The
key question here is that corruption has different social costs across countries because
it creates transaction costs and uncertainties in the private sector. This justifies that
government interventions may be larger than how sustained for retaining some state
intervention to deal with market failures and in some countries good government
regulations become relevant in cutting corruption.
Even if by some remote chance the lack of economic freedom is a major cause
of corruption for every economy, there must be something else that strongly drives
corruption which can explain these results. We consider the broadest class of ran-
dom effect models to investigate the relationship between economic freedom and
corruption and propose a selective strategy in which nested and non-nested mul-
tilevel models are tested. We contribute to the previous literature by extending
the micro-founded economic freedom determinants of corruption with a model that
identifies differences in corruption across countries. Many earlier papers cited above
qualify their empirical tests by using aggregate macro data. But estimations using
aggregated macro data are not able to reproduce the expected relationships when
economic freedom is disaggregated by its components.
We begin our work by documenting the basic facts regarding the key variables
of our empirical specification. We then present a multilevel model, a more realistic
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framework to test the hypotheses of our work. The remainder of the paper estimates
the parameters of the selected models obtained by the sequential test strategy. Al-
though the results in the full sample are almost all in line with the predictions of the
standard economic predictions, attention to the firms’ heterogeneous responses and
cross-country effects is crucial for explaining the puzzle of heterogeneous outcomes
when the sample changes. As a result, in African countries and transition economies,
government regulations are able to cut inefficiencies and corruption which arise from
deficits in economic prosperity and efficient institution rules.
2. Economic freedom and Corruption linkages
2.1. Basic facts
In empirical studies, many difficulties lie in obtaining proper measures of corrup-
tion that identify and describe its linkage with the components of economic freedom.
By using survey data, Trasparency International measures the known corruption
perception index (CPI), highly used to describe the dynamics of corruption. As also
argued by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007), the perception-based indices of
corruption do not provide a robust estimation of bribery within countries. However,
these indicators remain informative for dynamics or aggregate comparison across
countries.
On the other hand, economic freedom can represent the degree to which the
policies and institutions of countries intervene in a society (Gwartney et al., 2000).
Their magnitude can affect individual incentives, the productive effort and the ef-
fectiveness of resource allocation (de Haan and Sturm, 2003; North and Thomas,
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1973). The official statistics record that, in recent periods, economic freedom has
improved. As measured by the index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFW),
the average level increased to 6.6 in 2000 from 5.8 in 1990, and it has been rising in
this first decade of the 21st century as well.
In Figure 1, the EFW (for 2000) index is displayed as a rough prediction of its effects
on cross-country corruption based on the Transparency International measure. As
expected, it does not show surprising results. As the EFW rises (less)corruption
increases linearly.
Fig. 1. Summary index score of economic freedom and corruption
Figure 2 shows the same relationship for the sub-sample of African countries. We
verify that a nonlinear humped-shaped relationship fits the data very well. Anticip-
ating one thesis of this paper, a prominent role is played by different government
interventions that determine an unpredictable relationship between economic free-
dom and corruption. However, corruption may also arise from sectors with large
economic freedom. As argued in Lambsdorff (2007) not all aspects of economic free-
dom deter corruption because some regulations may increase the transaction costs
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of corruption deals. In these cases, whether policy-makers are unresponsive to the
demand for regulation ”free” competition and the lack of government regulations
should be considered as a fallacy of policy formulation. When this behaviour is as-
sociated with a weak legal apparatus of recognition and enforcement of the state,
as recognized in less developed countries, corruption may strongly emerge because
spontaneous mechanisms of economic freedom are conditioned by local rules that
allow imposes private bribes, frequently as taxation, in order to improve business.
Under these conditions, competition and government regulations are expected to cut
corruption.
Fig. 2. Summary index score of economic freedom and corruption, sub-sample for Africa.
There is another source of issues regarding the economic freedom indicator used in
the empirical literature. As shown in Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), the summary index
score of economic freedom competes against its multidimensional representation of
freedom1. The existence of ambiguous correlations between components of economic
1The Fraser Index (2000), a frequently used index of economic freedom, consists for example of
23 components.
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freedom and its aggregate measure as well as the weight of the suppression effects
in aggregate may produce biases in explaining corruption effects. As an extension of
Figure II, it is possible to predict that the composition effects may be emphasized
if we collect data only for developing economies. We postpone discussion of these
aspects until the next sub-section.
2.2. The components of economic freedom and corruption
We do an exercise by aggregating the firms’ indicators of economic freedom and
corruption at the country level. We concentrate our attention on their descriptive
statistics obtained by the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), postponing
the description of the dataset in Section 4. We preserve the macro-level of the data
for comparison with the empirical analyses yielded in the economic literature2. We
have chosen our variables to be adaptable to the areas of the database ”economic
freedom of the world” (Gwartney et al., 2000). We single out five principal areas: (I)
market competition; (II) government regulation of private entrepreneurial activity;
(III) the ability of the financial system to support private firms; (IV) property rights
and the protection of contracts; (V) the regulation of export. Within of these eco-
nomic freedom areas, we extract indicators of interest described in Table 1. Figure
3 highlights the results of the descriptive analysis. To make easy reading the graph,
contrary to the scale of the Transparency International index, corruption increases
in the y axis, while economic freedom decreases moving to the right of the x axis,
2We remark that our aim is to give some descriptive insights to the relation to be tested. This is
statistically equivalent to aggregating all individual level variables to the group level and carrying
out ordinary least squares, for example, by doing regression over group means. A problem with
this technique is that within-group information variation is lost (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998).
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except for the regulation of trade (panel e), in which the score rises. As is shown
in panels a to e, it is not possible to delineate a clear picture concerning the stat-
istical co-movements between these economic freedom indices and corruption. Both
for market competition (panel a) and government regulation components (panels b
to e), the graph dispersions are not able to confirm the expected relationships sug-
gested by standard theory. Furthermore, these graphs clearly highlight the existence
of groups of countries in the data because the effects of the components of economic
freedom on corruption have not occurred everywhere in the same way. That is, it
emerges that part of the variation of these relationships can be interpreted in terms
of unobserved differences between countries.
A way to account for the magnitude of these differences across countries is to
estimate the aforementioned relationships by a multilevel framework. Because we
use the individual firms’ observations in line with the theoretical microfounded rela-
tionships, we show that on average the economic responses of firms are differentiated
across countries. Namely, it is assumed that microdata are not completely independ-
ent such as the results are affected by these clustered structures of the underlying
data. Put it differently, the perception of corruption and economic freedom of firms
in the same country is more homogeneous that firms in differents countries. Below,
we will model this cross-country variability by including a set of aggregated indicators
that include the level of democracy or differences in economic development. In line
with the above classification, we model property rights and protections of contracts
at the micro-level as a condition for firms to legitimate contracts and exchanges and,
9
in general, the quality of institutions3.
Without losing of generality, a random intercept model is extended to the remain-
ing economic freedom components (panel f -h), although they consistently show that
more freedom in the financial system, export regulation and property right protection
lowers corruption. The objective of making general statements about phenomena for
a larger set of groups suggest, therefore, of assuming a specification in which the
intercept varies randomly across country units (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).
3. Econometric specification
In this section we provide a comprehensive description of the multilevel probit
model. The interest in these models is a natural improvement to the basic econo-
metric framework when micro-data contain clusters resulting from non-independent
observations. Firstly, the more highly correlated the observations are within clusters,
the more likely that ignoring clustering would result in biases in estimations and
inference. Secondly, the absence of a behavioural model of economic freedom com-
ponents on corruption makes the analysis still essentially descriptive addressing the
use of latent class models.
We consider a general formulation of a two-level model. We observe yij, a binary
response for corruption propensity within firms i and related to country j and xij,
a set of explanatory variables at the firm level. We assume that a latent continuous
3A criticism to model the quality of institutions on corruption at the micro-level might be based
on the low variability of preferences and expectations in face to firms. Mocan (2008) yields a model
in which it is assumed that an increase in the quality of the institutions in a country, which would
increase the probability of apprehension, would in turn reduce the propensity to ask for a bribe.
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Note: the figures are built by aggregating individual data of economic freedom components and corruption at the country level. The
economic freedom areas used to share economic freedom components are derived by Gwartny et al. (2000). For further information
on sources, see section 4.1.
Fig. 3. Economic freedom components and corruption, full sample.
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variable yij∗ exists underlying yij. We observe our binary response variable yij dir-
ectly, but not yij∗. We know that yij = 1 if yij∗ > 0 and yij = 0 if yij∗ ≤ 0 . We
write the multilevel model for yij∗ as
yij∗ = β0j + β1xij +
H∑
h=1
βhxi0 + eij where eij|xij ∼ N(0, pi) (1)
where β0j are country specific intercepts and β1 is the regression coefficient of each
economic freedom component. Since we are interested in assessing the impact of
the different typologies of economic freedom separately, equation (1) can be seen
as a companion matrix that includes the nine indicators, xij, in the diagonal and
otherwise zero. We also include in (1) the firms’ fixed effects, xi0, evaluated by the
parameters βh, while eij are the first level residual terms. Under the hypothesis of a
random effect model, we can explicit βoj as
β0j = γ00 + γ01w
1
0j + u0j where u0j|xij ∼ N(0, ψ) (2)
where γ00 is the intercept and γ01 are the coefficients of the vector of observed macro-
covariates of the second stage to allow us to identify cross-country variation, w10j.
u0j is the random effect of level two related to the country-specific intercept β0j.
The assumption that part of variability of the fit model can be identified by the
between-country covariates, w10j, does not prevent that the unobserved variability
of the country effects may generate dependence between firms’ economic freedom
components, xij. Below we turn to the specification of an extended model that
contains parameters associated with issues of endogeneity and to the implementation
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of nested restriction tests.
Conditioned to the random effect u0j, a probit model is specified by assuming
that eij has a standard normal distribution. As common in this literature, clusters
j are assumed independent, the covariance between different firms, Cov(eijei′j) = 0,
and the two level error terms are not correlated, Cov(u0j, eij) = 0, such that we can
write the reduced form of the model as
yij∗ = γ00 + γ01w10j + β1xij +
H∑
h=1
βhxi0 + u0j + eij (3)
Assuming that u0j is normally distributed, the strategy for estimating the model
parameters is to integrate the unobserved random effect, u0j,
f(yj|xj, w1j ) =
∫
f(yj|xj, w1j , u0j)g(u0j)du0j, (4)
where g(.) represents the normal density function4. As a result, the unconditional
estimation does not determine a closed expression. Maximum likelihood estimation
has to resort to approximation procedures such as numerical integration. Rabe-
Hesketh et al. (2002) proposed an algorithm by using the posterior mean and variance
of the random effects, which are calculated by building on the work of Naylor and
Smith (1982)5. If the assumed distribution is normal, the numerical quadrature
4For the sake of simplicity, we include the fixed effects of the first level in the intercept parameter
(γ00).
5Although marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) and penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) are largely
used in statistical literature, these are found to generate downwardly biased estimates (Hedeker,
2008).
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approach yields a deviance(Υ) that can be readily used for likelihood-ratio tests. This
statistic is given as Υ = 2(ln f(y|ϑ˜)−ln f(y|ϑ̂), where ln f(y | ϑ˜)is the loglikelihood for
the saturated model and ln f(y | ϑ̂) is the loglikelihood for the model of interest. Some
nested specifications can be obtained by the imposition of parameter restrictions
calling for a simple likelihood ratio test on the parameter(s) restrictions,
LR = 2 (ln ffull(yij|θ 6= 0)− ln frestr (yij|θ = 0)) (5)
which has an approximate χ2 distribution with a number of degrees of freedoms equal
to the imposed restrictions on the parameters.
From the multilevel model there is no insurance that the unexplained variabil-
ity among different countries’ corruption propensity does not include the effect of
omitted macro-variables related to institutions rules and economic growth indicators
which, in turn, is correlated with the xij. For this reason, we model an extended spe-
cification of the (3) that includes endogeneity issues. Following Snijders and Berkhof
(2004), the aforementioned dependence can be expressed as a regression,
w20j = α00 + α01x¯· j + ε0j (6)
where x¯· j is the cluster mean of xij. By inserting equation (6) into (3), the random
intercept model depends on x¯· j, while the reduced form of the model is given as
yij∗ = γ∗00 + γ01w10j + α01x¯· j + β1xij +
H∑
h=1
βhxi0 + u
∗
0j + eij (7)
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where γ∗00 = γ00 + α00, and u
∗
0j = u0j + ε0j. The exclusion from the analysis of the
cluster mean, x¯· j, when α01 6= 0, yields a biased estimator of β1.
It is worth noting that control variables for political, economic and institutional
characteristics of the country, which may also be those correlated with both cor-
ruption and economic freedom components, reduce the endogeneity yielded by the
unobserved components of the random effect model. As a restriction of the model in
equation (7), we assess the macro-variables effects by imposing the vector γ01 = 0.
Formally,
yij∗ = γ∗00 + α01x¯· j + β1xij +
H∑
h=1
βhxi0 + u
∗
0j + eij (8)
Figure IV summarizes the nested relationships among models, showing the rel-
evant restrictions on the likelihood function of equation (7). A sequential strategy
of the model selection process can be implemented reasonably by partitioning ob-
served and unobserved macro-variates, W0j =
[
w10j;w
2
0j
]
. A double route for testing
nested models arises with respect to our focus, because it is not determined a priori
if fixed macro-indicators are able to cut endogeneity significantly. Assuming that
the restrictions of the vector of parameters θ1 = θ|γ01 = 0 and θ2 = θ|α01 = 0 are
not rejected separately, before passing to the next step and testing the restricted
models against the benchmark random intercept model, i.e. a model without fixed
effects and random coefficients, we have to decide if a best model exists identifying
the cross-country variation in the data. By defining the conditional function density
for the restricted models, f(y|x, θ1) and g(y|x, θ2), conventional and adjusted (Vuong
1989) LR tests are used for these non-nested specifications (step 2, Figure IV). The
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null hypothesis of model equivalence, H0 : E
[
log f(y|x,θ1)
g(y|x,θ2)
]
= 0, is tested against
competing model, H1 : E
[
log f(y|x,θ1)
g(y|x,θ2)
]
> 0 or H1 : E
[
log f(y|x,θ1)
g(y|x,θ2)
]
< 0 . If H0
is rejected, in the first case we prefer f(.) to g(.) and vice-versa if the result is in
line with the second hypothesis. Finally, the best model is tested against the basic
”random effect” model adding,
∑H
h=1 βhxi0 = 0, if restricted a model with γ01 = 0 or
α01 = 0 was found.
Fig. 4. Strategy for testing nested and non-nested models.
4. Estimations
4.1. Data and empirical models
The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from the Voices of the Firms
2000 of the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a cross-sectional survey of
industrial and service enterprises conducted in mid-1999 by the World Bank and some
other agencies. This survey represents the most comprehensive source of micro-data
for analyzing both corruption and economic freedom by firms’ perception responses.
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The WBES survey covers 67 countries in which, on average, more than 100 firms
were interviewed. Appendix 1 reports the list of countries by macro-regions and
the specific number of firms interviewed. This survey provides detailed information
on private viewpoints regarding taxation, government regulation and the financial
sector, as well as on perceived corruption raised from the business experience. On
the contrary, there is a lack of information concerning controlled and participated
enterprises. Although some information on assets, sales, ownership, employees and
enterprise growth were collected, it is not enough to fill up detailed balance sheet
information and profit and loss statements, reducing the possibility to control firm
heterogeneity by economic performances.
In the empirical analysis below we use the discrete variable of perceived corruption
as dependent variable. This index (apay) measures ”how usual it is for firms to
have to pay some irregular additional payments to obtain a service from the public
administration”. This variable (from 1 to 6) indicates the increase of perception
regarding the degree of corruption in the line of business in which operates. The
response to the corruption items offers an interpretation not only concerning his
direct experience but is assumed to include the behaviour of the closest firms in the
same environment. This index also endorses the operational definition of corruption
that includes the private sector and stands in clear contrast with characterizations
of corruption that focus solely on the public sector. Following Hodgson and Jiang
(2007), the role of corruptive phenomena in the private sector, in fact, conceptually
extends the interactions between private and public sectors (and their institutions)
and provides different implications of the state intervention on corruption.
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In line with the econometric specification discussed above, we aggregate mod-
alities to generate a dichotomous variable assuming 0 for low corruption and 1 for
perceived high corruption6. Thus, the corruption index is assumed to be expressible
as a (non)linear combination of each economic freedom component and variables that
account for the firm’s fixed effects as well as for a set of macro-variables, that are able
to identify the level(or differences) of the economic development of the countries.
Table 1 reports the description of the explanatory variables selected. The fore-
going discussions and the implementation of tests to choose the adequate model
require, however, argumentations over the economic freedom indicators generated by
the firms’ survey. Specifically, the economic freedom components rest on suggestions
taken from the empirical literature and are intended to break up the determinants of
the summary index score described in section 2. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Svens-
son (2005) argue that a positive degree of competitiveness in a country (comp)(AREA
I, Table 1) reduces the probability of corruption. In this approach, a non-competitive
market serves to feed corruption by a rent channel that consolidates a non-market
system of the bureaucrats’ behaviour and constrains the flow of information from a
competition environment out of the firms’ control. Emerson (2006) presents a model
of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show
that corruption is antithetical to competition. As argued by Lambsdorff (2007), the
empirical results are sensitive from which measure of competition is used. Below, we
test the hypothesis by using the number of firms as a proxy of competition, because
6For a comprehensive review of the aggregate corruption perception indexes see Kaufmann et al.
(1999).
18
T
a
b
le
1
D
a
ta
a
n
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
s
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
D
E
S
C
R
IP
T
IO
N
R
A
N
G
E
A
R
E
A
S
O
U
R
C
E
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
-
a
b
le
a
p
a
y
n
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
d
ex
P
o
ly
co
to
m
o
u
s
v
a
ri
a
b
le
fr
o
m
1
to
6
(1
lo
w
-
es
t
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
,
6
h
ig
h
es
t
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
).
T
h
is
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
d
a
s
a
d
ic
h
o
to
m
o
u
s
v
a
ri
a
b
le
fr
o
m
0
to
1
,
w
h
er
e
0
(n
o
co
rr
u
p
-
ti
o
n
)
1
(c
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
)
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
E
co
n
o
m
ic
fr
ee
d
o
m
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
co
m
p
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
co
m
p
et
it
iv
n
es
s
in
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
(n
u
m
b
er
o
f
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
in
th
e
m
a
rk
et
)
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
co
m
p
et
it
o
rs
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(m
o
re
th
a
n
3
co
m
p
et
it
o
rs
)
A
re
a
I
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
g
in
v
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
o
n
in
v
es
t-
m
en
ts
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
-
ti
o
n
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(f
u
ll
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
)
A
re
a
II
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
g
em
p
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
o
n
em
p
lo
y
-
m
en
t
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
-
ti
o
n
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(f
u
ll
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
)
A
re
a
II
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
g
sl
e
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
o
n
sa
le
s
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
-
ti
o
n
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(f
u
ll
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
)
A
re
a
II
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
g
p
ce
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
o
n
p
ri
ce
s
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
-
ti
o
n
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(f
u
ll
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
)
A
re
a
II
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
f
a
g
r
ee
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
sy
st
em
a
b
il
it
y
to
p
ro
v
id
e
fi
n
-
a
n
ci
n
g
to
th
e
p
ri
v
a
te
se
ct
o
r
F
ro
m
0
to
1
.
0
(fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
),
1
(n
o
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
)
A
re
a
II
I
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
f
co
n
st
P
re
se
n
ce
o
f
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
F
ro
m
0
to
4
.
0
(n
o
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
)
u
n
ti
l
4
(fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
)
A
re
a
II
I
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
f
r
k
r
eg
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
o
n
tr
a
d
e
F
ro
m
0
to
3
.
0
(n
o
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
-
ti
o
n
)
u
n
ti
l
3
(f
u
ll
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
)
A
re
a
V
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
p
r
p
r
o
t
L
eg
a
l
sy
st
em
a
b
il
it
y
to
p
ro
te
ct
p
ro
p
-
er
ty
ri
g
h
ts
a
n
d
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
F
ro
m
1
to
4
.
1
(i
n
effi
ci
en
t
le
g
a
l
sy
st
em
)
to
4
(e
ffi
ci
en
t
le
g
a
l
sy
st
em
)
A
re
a
IV
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
M
ic
ro
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
si
z
e
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
in
th
e
fi
rm
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
ty
p
e
L
eg
a
l
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
0
(i
n
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
w
n
er
)
1
(f
a
m
il
y
)
2
(g
ro
u
p
)
3
(b
a
n
k
)
4
(s
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
b
o
a
rd
)
5
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
6
(g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t)
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
M
a
cr
o
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
G
D
P
G
ro
ss
d
o
m
es
ti
c
p
ro
d
u
ct
p
er
-c
a
p
it
a
W
D
I
I
N
V
P
ri
v
a
te
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
a
s
sh
a
re
o
f
G
D
P
W
D
I
G
O
V
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
sp
en
d
in
g
a
s
sh
a
re
o
f
G
D
P
W
D
I
G
I
N
I
G
in
i
co
effi
ci
en
t
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
in
-
co
m
e
W
D
I
C
I
V
I
L
C
iv
il
li
b
er
ty
in
d
ex
F
ro
m
1
to
6
.
1
(n
o
ci
v
il
li
b
er
ti
es
)
u
n
ti
l
6
(f
u
ll
ci
v
il
li
b
er
ti
es
)
W
A
O
N
o
te
:
”
W
B
E
S
2
0
0
0
”
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
W
o
rl
d
B
u
si
n
e
ss
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
S
u
rv
e
y
,
p
u
b
li
sh
e
d
b
y
th
e
w
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
in
2
0
0
0
,
”
W
D
I”
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
W
o
rl
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
a
n
d
”
W
A
O
”
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
W
o
rl
d
A
u
d
it
O
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
.
19
the survey does not contain an explicit indicator of entry barriers of new firms, ex-
cept for foreign firms. The limits of implementing this index are known, specifically
in developing countries, where the barriers can be addressed to avoid the entry of
foreign firms. As a result, local firms competing with quality rather than prices are
forced to establish myopic behaviour, without a specific worldly wisdom for high-
quality reputation. Under these conditions, competition may even increase rather
than decrease corruption.
Among the components of economic freedom, corruption is assumed to be influ-
enced by government regulation components (AREA II). Because some specific effects
strictly depend on the structure and efficiency of the market, it would be wrong to
see corruption as consequences of excessive regulation or to imagine that complete
laissez-faire will always be the answer (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). The perspective
that government regulation hampers productive effort, encourages rent seeking and
increases the discretionary power of a few public officers still reigns throughout gov-
ernment institutions and scholars (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Paldam, 2002), though
it is argued that when government regulation is weak or almost absent, an increase
in market rules is crucial to develop a solid productive sector (Hodgson, 2003)7.
These features have at least two important implications when examining cor-
ruption practices in developing country economies. First, results from developed
countries should not be directly extended to developing countries’ settings without
7Developing countries are often characterized by weak law enforcement, a large informal sector,
underdeveloped capital markets, and informal credit and insurance networks. As an example,
informal arrangements, such as family networks of credit and insurance, have been found to very
much influence the impact of interventions, limiting the beginning of corruption.
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a serious reflection upon their differences. In fact, to the trade-off between benefits
and dis-benefits of state intervention leading with market failures (Acemoglu and
Verdier, 2000), we have to add the different impact of negative externalities of cor-
ruption in any context. Second and foremost, empirical research has tended to focus
on the impact of the overall size of the government budget relative to GDP, often
ignoring the interactions of each government regulation component. The test that
the size of government is positively correlated with the level of corruption is weak.
In fact, Elliott (1997) and Adsera (2003) obtain reverse findings, while Graeff and
Mehlkop (2003) and Billger and Goel (2009) show ambiguous results that can only
be slightly disentangled by observing the relation in a sub-sample of countries or con-
ditioning the distribution of corruption variable across countries, respectively. These
evidences also suggest another avenue. That is, that the particular types of govern-
ment expenditure might have a different potential, and perhaps more important, to
cause corruption with respect to the size of government. Heterogeneity of goods and
services supplied in free market are an important source of transaction costs that
may be reduced by government regulations, though the planning these interventions
may bring large problems of corruption. In our empirical analyses, we differentiate
the components of government regulation and control for the levels of development
of a country in assessing their impact on corruption. The sign and the magnitude
of the government regulation indicators on corruption, i.e. government interventions
on investments (ginv), on employment (gemp), on sales (gsle) and on prices (gpce),
becomes therefore an empirical issue.
It has been postulated that the ability of the formal financial system to provide
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financing to the private sector (fagree) reduces the corruption effects (AREA III).
This relationship is unquestionably mitigated by a different degree (or quality) of
financial institutions of the countries. As a result, low levels of the country quality
of financial institutions may yield a reverse causation of the estimated relationship.
Safavian et al. (2001), investigating data from small businesses in Russia, reports that
the enterprises more harried by corruption also apply more often for external finance.
However, Brunetti et al. (1997) ranking the levels of corruption found that the second
most significant impediment to doing business without corruption is the lack of fin-
ancing. We include the effects of financial constraints on corruption (fconst) that
is expected to be in their pathological or inefficient expression in the developing or
transition countries. It is worth noting that liquidity constraints often emerges in the
transition economies, although the financial system may be able to provide financing
for the private sector. A feature of these economies is that a high level of investment
projects, associated with a potentially inefficient financial system, requires a higher
level of intermediation costs. As argued in Ahlin and Pang (2008), these costs related
to the magnitude of investment are directly associated to corrupt payments. On the
other hand, if corruption is costly for firms, it feeds the demand for corruption as
taxation and keeps these financial constraints in the supply of financing.
The legal system’s ability to protect property right contracts (prprot, AREA IV)
is widely suggested as being a policy intervention to reduce corruption in the world
economies. Failure of the legal system to provide for the enforcement of contracts
undermines the operation of the free market and, in turn, reduces the incentives for
agents to participate in productive activities (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). This
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implies that corruption increases. On the contrary to the current literature, we
specify a microfounded relationship because firms are able to account for failures in
operation of the free market and in line with an extended definition of corruption for
private spheres.
Finally, government regulation on export and international trade (frkreg, AREA
V) is assumed to increase the level of corruption. There are at least three reasons for
explaining the hypothesized empirical evidences. Firstly, this effect is linked with the
relation between firm rents in a noncompetitive market and import licensing. Krueger
(1974) argues that when the number of licenses is fixed, the firm is encouraged to
compete to obtain the largest amount of trade licensing. A rational firm will shift
productive plans to rent intensive activities and it could turn to bribing transactions
to win trade licensing. Secondly, trade barriers may favour inefficient local firms to
foreign competitors and forms of corruption may easily arise. Finally, import barriers
create an artificial scarcity of specific commodities, channelling part of the non-
competitive higher prices towards corrupt bureaucrats that, in developing countries
or transition economies, may lead to underground economies. The empirical evidence
has provided questionable support of a negative sign in the relation between the
extension of international trade and corruption (Treisman, 2000; Torrez, 2002).
In empirical applications, the first level of equations (3), (7) and (8) is usually
assumed to be also a function of firms’ factors affecting corruption rather than the
specific economic freedom components. As largely discussed by Beck et al. (2002),
the extent of corruption effects depends on the firm’s size (size), as well as on its
legal organization (type) and the sector in which it operates (sector). These variables
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are included in all model specifications as fixed effects within countries.
Above we have justified multilevel (economic) models because the corruption
perception of firms and its relation with economic freedom components depends on
country’s economic conditions and it is also constrained and mould by institutions
(in Hodgson sense) self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating characteristics. Thus, we
assume that the random intercept model is determined by (macro) country-factors,
leaving to the statistical significance of the means of the economic freedom indicators
to check mutual interaction and interdependence (endogeneity)8. A set of these
indicators in this work are assumed to explain an unobserved variability induced by
differences across the country development conditions. Traditional macroeconomic
indicators are the gross domestic product per-capita (GDP ) 9, the private investment
share in GDP (INV ) and the Gini-coefficient of distribution of income (GINI).
Moreover, (La Porta et al., 1999). In the multilevel model we also include the share
of government spending in GDP (GOV ). As shown by La Porta et al. (1999), the
size of the state and its quality represents a key variable to explain differences across
countries in corruption.
In addition, we include the civil liberties index (CIV IL) as a proxy of the level of
democracy in a country (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). It is known that a strong demo-
cratic regime enforces the reliability of public action, decreasing the firms’ market
power and reducing illegal profit gains10. The relevance of including this indicator
8This assumption makes symmetric the investigated statistical relationships. However, as sus-
tained by Archer (1995), these relationships are realistically asymmetric since institutions typically
precede the activities of individuals.
9We use capital letters to distinguish the macro-variables.
10Treisman (2000) suggests, among other things, that more developed and more long-standing
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for our analysis is justified because the rise of democracy is found to decrease corrup-
tion (Emerson, 2006) and, in general, economic growth ( Bardhan, 1997; Dreher and
Herzfeld, 2005). This leads to assume that as democracy increases corruption seems
to fall, irrespective of the level of corruption of a country. On the other hand, the
significant impacts of democracy on economic freedom components are well known
in this literature (Lundstrom, 2005). It is worth noting that since the quality of
the institutions has a direct impact on corruption the very low level of the civil
liberties index in developing countries decreases the possibility of controlling for the
legal system’s ability, to protect property rights and prevent corruption. It is not
difficult, in turn, to predict a reduction of the certainty of property rights (Acemoglu
and Verdier, 1998) though, once more, endogeneity issues may arise as a result in
estimations.
4.2. Results
The choice of the most appropriate specification consists in testing, for each equa-
tion, the models presented in Section 3 and summarized in Figure 4. Parsimonious
models obtained by placing the relevant restrictions on the likelihood function and
are interpreted as special cases of endogenous multilevel probit model (7). Conven-
tional and adjusted likelihood ratio formulation is reported in Table 2.
In the first row, model (7) is tested against model (8) in which macro-effect
restrictions are imposed (i.e. γ01 = 0). The results of the LR-test for the nine econo-
metric specifications corresponding to each economic freedom variable clearly reject
democratic countries are less corrupt.
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Table 2
Specification tests, full sample.
comp ginv gemp gsle gpce fagree fconst prprot frkreg
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 905.56 811.83 821.0637 809.92 813.35 904.48 932.81 836.65 896.28
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 0.70 1.33 2.21 1.62 2.14 0.04 1.75 2.70 2.20
V.S Exogenous model (equation 3) (0.40) (024) (0.13) (0.20) (0.14) (0.83) (0.18) (0.10) (0.13)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 905.56 3326.89 3495.53 3467.49 3514.36 3603.52 2880.63 3753.51 3295.41
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 4450.37 4137.39 4314.38 4275.79 4325.57 4507.96 3715.54 4683.63 4189.50
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 7.93 17.67 18.00 15.47 11.47 8.47 8.05 -3.74 10.17
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (4.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: we report the p − values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal
distribution. The extended model (equation 7) includes endogeneity, macro and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (equation
8) includes endogeneity and firm fixed-effects. The exogenous model (equation 3) includes macro and firm-fixed effects.
the hypotheses tested and indicate that these variables are relevant in identifying
corruption differences across countries. On the contrary, as shown in the second row,
we never reject the endogeneity restriction, α01 = 0, because the empirical LR-test
is always lower than the critical value at the usual percentile. To complete the ana-
lysis, we test model specification (3) against the basic random effect model in which
fixed micro-effects and country identifying variables are restricted to zero (βh = 0 and
γ01 = 0). The LR-test rejects the restricted basic model confirming that equation (3)
is the best model to rationalize the data. By completing the selection strategy, the
Voung test (1989) is implemented testing exogenous random effect model (3) against
non-nested random effect model with endogeneity (8). The Vuong test statistic leads
to the rejection of the hypothesis of model equivalence for each specification and to
favouring the model in equation (3). If we evaluate the restrictions from the en-
dogenous random effect model, with firm-fixed effects restricted, the test provides
further support to the model chosen (Table 2, row five).
Maximum-likelihood estimates are presented in Table 3. We remark that the use
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of a multilevel approach instead of a normal logit regression insures that we avoid
misleading significance effects due to violations of the assumption of independent
errors with a constant variance. This effect is confirmed in our regression results, in
which the multilevel regressions display lower levels of significance compared to the
logit regression with the same model specification11. To support this result, we report
the intra-class correlation (ρ) for each estimated specification12. For each equation,
about 30 percent of the total variability of corruption is attributable to the countries’
heterogeneity. Although there are considerable differences in the magnitude of the
coefficients both significance and direction of the influence conform in the majority
of cases. According to it, the degree of economic prosperity is able to explain gains
in efficiency of the economic and social system and to control for corruption (Mauro,
1995). The hypothesis that high-income inequality corresponds to perceptions of
unfair state operations and makes the incidence of corruption more likely (Smelser,
1971) seems confirmed. Also the importance of the civil liberty index in reducing
corruption is in line with theoretical expectations, while an oversized state affects
the efficiency of expenditure and corruption seems to rise irrespective of its level.
Analogous to the country characteristics, we find very consistent patterns at the
firm level except that the legal organization of the firm (type). The probability of
corruptive practises in bigger firms is pervasively found to be 12− 13 percent lower
independently of the economic freedom equation used. Contrary to that, the indus-
11Estimation results obtained on these sub-samples are available from the authors.
12As usual, we measure the relationship of the benchmark model by the intraclass correlation
(ICC) given as, ρ = Corr(u0j + eij , u0j + ei′j) = ψψ+θ for i
′ 6= i, where ψ is the proportion of the
between-country residual variance with respect to the total residual variance.
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trial sector has a higher (on average 5 percent) propensity to experiment corruption,
possibly reflecting the better market independence of services to cope with smaller
businessmen on starting and/or developing economic activities.
Government regulations on investment, employment, sales and prices increase
corruption (Table 3, columns 2− 5). Inefficiencies caused by an over-regulated eco-
nomic system seem, therefore, to be able to distort private productive activity and to
influence corruptive behaviours. Because of the critical role that the labour market
plays in the process of economic development (see, e.g., Caballero and Hammour,
2000; Foster et al., 2002; Bartelsman et al., 2004), understanding whether labour
market institutions actually help or hinder corruption phenomena stands out as an
important task. Although very similar effects across countries are found when look-
ing at individual components of government regulations, protection of employment
registers the highest propensity (0.131) in affecting corruption. As expected, where
labour market institutions are developed, adding government employment regula-
tions can weigh down the processes of agreement and facilitate corruption practises
obtained while mediating among firms, workers and unions. Similarly, the others
government regulation indicators significantly affect the reduction of corruption.
In columns 6 and 7, we present the estimated outcomes related to financial market
constraints. As expected, according to the compositional effects of countries with
different degrees of financial development, we find that constraints in private and
public financing projects (fconst) increase the probability of corruption while, quite
surprisingly, financial systems (fagree) do not seem to affect it. Our estimations also
comply with the general knowledge on the importance of trade regulation (frkreg)
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in increasing corruption found by the works of Ades and Di Tella (1997, 1999), Sung
and Chu (2003) and Gerring and Thacker (2005).
By far the largest and most significant effect on corruption is exerted by the legal
system to protect property rights and contracts (−0.218). We find that limiting the
possibility to confiscate private property or repudiating contracts produces positive
externalities and seems to determine general improvements in the quality of insti-
tutions. As discussed in Glaeser et al. (2001, p. 853), however, this result strictly
depends on the difficulty in enforcing complex private contracts and on the potential
advantages of a parallel developed framework for organizing private transactions.
Opposite to that, we find no significance of the degree of competition (comp).
As discussed above, the effects on corruption of the competition level among firms
is uncertain. Heavy competition could incite them to pay commissions in order to
make up for their weak negotiating power and get market shares as well as a lower
competition incites them to anticipate significant rents and to pay bribes in order to
get new markets. We anticipate that for subsamples of countries heavy competition,
when associated with restrictions on trade, may determine a rise of corruption.
We test the robustness of our results considering two sub-samples, Africa and
Eastern Europe countries. We justify this strategy because comparing the level of
corruption of African economies with the rest of the world is traditionally argued that
these shortfalls of ”good” behaviour are the result of differences in infrastructures,
macroeconomic mismanagement and weak administrations that affect the microfoun-
ded relationships investigates. For example, following Transparency International for
the years around 2000, the corruption index for the African region is about 3.35/10,
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while the world mean is about 4.00/10. Also the Eastern Europe countries are an
interesting case study because of their choice to pass to a freer market economy and
democratic regimes during the 90s (i.e., transition economies). As reported in Graeff
and Mehlkop (2003), with the exception of Estonia, Transparency International rates
the most former communist countries as being highly corrupt. On the other hand,
although the liberalization policies in transition countries have been extremely rel-
evant during last decade, the same source of data confirms lesser economic freedom
(5.5/10) with respect to the world mean (6.23/10). In particular, the reforms in
public sector activities, namely privatization, did not achieve one of their objectives
(in 2000 and even after that year) to reduce corruption13.
Table 4
Specification tests, sub-sample of the African countries.
comp ginv gemp gsle gpce fagree fconst prprot frkreg
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 516.08 520.87 517.44 516.18 522.39 527.15 472.14 515.48 499.57
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) l (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 8.90 0.37 6.58 1.23 0.42 2.80 3.21 6.53 1.61
V.S Exogenous model (equation 3) (0.40) (0.54) (0.01) (0.26) (0.51) (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.20)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 144.46 355.28 365.61 349.49 347.02 342.25 351.47 395.47 336.40
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 651.63 875.78 876.47 864.45 868.99 866.60 820.41 904.43 834.36
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 43.01 6.61 94.35 75.23 33.69 40.38 23.37 12.93 27.73
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: we report the p − values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal
distribution. The extended model (equation 7) includes endogeneity, macro and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (equation
8) includes endogeneity and firm fixed-effects. The exogenous model (equation 3) includes macro and firm-fixed effects.
13The main cause of this failure is clearly discussed by Hodgson (2007) who indicates that ”under
the communist regimes, informal economic networks often spanned and surpassed ethnic divisions.
But political crises and economic recessions.....have inhibited the establishment of a market system
with clear and general rules .... affecting economic legality”. Specifically, the privatization process in
the former USSR, characterized by the sale of state assets, was marked by an increase in corruption
because many ideas of traditionalism upheld and were not included in the decisional process criteria
of rationality and effectiveness. This offered at oligarchy an opportunity to accumulate illegal
fortunes (Sachs, 2005).
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Table 5
Specification tests, sub-sample of the Transition economies.
comp ginv gemp gsle gpce fagree fconst frkreg prprot
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 259.13 230.42 239.79 244.58 247.68 257.20 241.48 255.47 235.25
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 0.00 0.09 0.15 3.58 3.00 0.97 6.20 0.36 1.87
V.S Exogenous model (equation 3) (1.00) (0.76) (0.69) (0.05) (0.08) (0.32) (0.01) (0.54) (0.17)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 289.90 294.99 298.15 285.59 295.65 294.71 251.08 290.79 271.98
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 549.03 525.32 537.78 526.60 540.33 550.95 486.35 545.90 505.36
V.S Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 49.99 84.77 85.76 7642 103.51 24.88 18.72 -39.25 31.44
V.S Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: we report the p − values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal
distribution. The extended model (equation 7) includes endogeneity, macro and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (equation
8) includes endogeneity and firm fixed-effects. The exogenous model (equation 3) includes macro and firm-fixed effects.
We rerun the selection strategy reported in Figure 4. We confirm an exogenous
multilevel specification for almost all the corruption equations of these subsamples,
except for someone where endogeneity is relevant. In these cases it is suggested the
need of including the mean of the firms’ variables to account for these issues (Table
4-5, row 2).
Tables 6 and 7 present maximum-likelihood estimates. Quite surprisingly, we find
that significant residual variance of the second level exceeds 20 percent in many equa-
tions of Africa, showing that country’s information plays a relevant role in explaining
corruption. This is also the case of transition countries although the significant vari-
ation of the intercept of country level is on average slightly more than 10 percent.
The explanatory variables at country level have the expected significant effects in
most cases, with some exceptions. Neither GDP and CIV ILN for African coun-
tries nor INV for transition economies exerts a relevant impact on corruption, while
both large significance and differences of the size of government appears to explain
the most of the country’s variability. Its positive impact emphasizes the thesis that
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inefficiencies generated by a wide expenditure feed corruptive practises as a misuse
of recurrent government budget. Additionally, we anticipate that the inclusion of the
country-mean of the explicative variables (i.e., gemp and pprot for Africa and gsle
and fconst for transition economies) can generate a loss of their significance.
The estimated relationships both for these subsamples point out changes in gov-
ernment regulation components (ginv), (gemp), (gsle) and (gpce), suggesting that
these government interventions are more likely to hinder corruption. These results,
in line with Elliott’s (1997) argumentations, confirm that the types of government
activity provided can directly affect corruption and, indirectly, control for the size of
the state expenditure.
Not surprisingly, we find a positive impact of the degree of competition (comp)
on corruption. As previously mentioned, this result is affected by the high levels
of trade barriers that are able to favour local firms and activities and may yield a
greater propensity to corrupt bureaucrats. In line with the findings of Gupta et al.
(2001), more competition among prevalent local firms, that also share similar norms
and rules, incites them to pay commissions to enhance their profitability.
The negative sign of property rights (m prprot) strengthens the perception that
institutional rules help to sustain economic activities and reduces corruptive phe-
nomena in African countries. As expected, the control for endogeneity produces in-
significant estimated coefficients for GOV and CIV ILN . This implies that not only
properly functioning property right rules but also sustained political interventions
are necessary to improve the issue related to corruption and defend the structure of
institutional rules because they do not guarantee the absence of large social costs.
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However, in the models that include endogeneity, the microfounded relationships
can also show an opposite sign in the estimated coefficient, with respect to those of the
country-mean. This is evident for government regulation on employment for Africa
(gemp), as well as of government regulation on sales in transition economies (gsle).
While the costs of corruption for Africa are difficult to be reduced by micro-regulation
of gemp (as shown by the insignificant value of the coefficient), the minimization of
corruption will depend on the effectiveness of institutional labour designs, net of the
development level of a country. On the contrary, transition economies may internalize
advantages of gsle on corruption by applying policies that not give incentives for an
efficient regulation on sales assignments that cuts the costs of corruption.
As suggested by the strategy tests, the financial system (fconst) in transition
countries is estimated with the additional country-mean regressor as well. The sig-
nificance of this parameter, together with that at the firm level, strengthens the idea
that better financial systems are beneficial for combating corruption and enhancing
economic growth. Although this result is generally accepted, when we analyze cor-
ruption outcomes for economies in transition they are more complex for the existence
of interaction with investments in the private sector. As an example, the lack of in-
stitutional rules for the financial system in the former communist economies, soon
after the period of reform, has been grounds for increasing phenomena of corruption
in growing investments. The significance of the parameter of private investments
(INV) confirms the hypothesis of detrimental financial system effects on corruption
at least in short run.
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5. Concluding remarks
The standard economic model predicts that government intervention transfers
resources from the private sector and generates room for corruption. Provided that
economic freedom rises sufficiently, the level of corruption tends to fall and keeps fall-
ing as the quality of institutions continues to rise. This mechanism received support
from conventional estimates of the aggregate economic freedom indicators though the
work of Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) documenting that the response of corruption to
the components of economic freedom appears to be contradictory. Furthermore, the
corruption literature has emphasized the importance of microfounding relationships
as an explanation for its determinants (Mocan, 2008).
The purpose of this paper has been to complement previous approaches by estim-
ating cross-country economic freedom and corruption relationships based on multi-
level models. In terms of the topic we study, our contribution is to incorporate
simultaneously the empirical facts presented in Section 2.2 and to test the previous
relationships by a vast sample of firms’ data in developing and developed countries.
We estimate these relationships correcting for the unobserved variability in the de-
gree of development of a country (or groups). The indicators of economic prosperity,
income distribution and democracy at the country level are able to explain why some
countries have higher level of corruption. We capture heterogeneity in estimations
and remove the empirical issues linked with aggregate data. At the microeconomic
level, we can explain when government regulation interventions are incentives and
when they are discouragements. A further result of our model is that competition
may be bad for corruption and will be so in less developed countries. In those coun-
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tries, a specific competition among national firms emerges by including the cost of
corruptive practises though these detrimental effects are mediated by the presence
of non-competitive rent-seeking sectors that, by lobbies, use pressure instruments to
block competitive policies.
If combating corruption is one of the main objectives of the incumbent govern-
ment, this paper notably suggests that a lack of competition policies and government
regulations may actually yield more corruption in less developed countries while
standard receipts of greater freedom may be applied in developed countries.
Our model links financial systems or property rights to corruption which are
considered positive mechanisms for growth. We answer the question whether these
components of economic freedom lead to reduce corruption and we find that, in gen-
eral, this hypothesis holds. Our model also shows a high and significant variability
across countries and the inclusion of identifying country-effects makes the relation-
ship more robust and confirms that democracy and the macroeconomic indicators
determine greater efficiency in combating corruption.
The policy makers’ line of intervention in less developed countries and trans-
ition economies appears to be clear although powerful interests, also distant from
theoretical discussions concerning the trade-off between government intervention or
not, have influenced the governments to take no action at all, making them almost
unresponsive to answer the need to regulate some sectors. As emerges from the
empirical analysis, outside the developed countries, policies should be addressed to
implement complementary strategy to reduce corruption and costs of the economic
growth, selecting (or not) heavy government interventions within sectoral businesses.
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF COUNTRIES BY MACRO-REGIONS
country name Africa Mena Transition East Asia South Asia Latin America OECD Total
Albania 0 0 163 0 0 0 0 163
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 50
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 50
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Botswana 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 101
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 201 0 201
Bulgaria 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
Cameroon 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 57
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 101
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
China 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 101
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 101
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Cote d’Ivoire 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 97
Croatia 0 0 127 0 0 0 0 127
Czech Republic 0 0 137 0 0 0 0 137
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 0 111 0 111
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Egypt. Arab Rep. 0 102 0 0 0 0 0 102
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 104 0 104
Estonia 0 0 132 0 0 0 0 132
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Ghana 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 119
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 106 0 106
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 103 0 103
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Hungary 0 0 129 0 0 0 0 129
India 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 210
Indonesia 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Kenya 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 113
Lithuania 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 112
Madagascar 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 116
Malawi 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
Malaysia 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Namibia 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 95
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Nigeria 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 93
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 103
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 108
Philippines 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Poland 0 0 225 0 0 0 0 225
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Romania 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
Russian Federation 0 0 525 0 0 0 0 525
Senegal 124 0 0 0 0 0 0 124
Singapore 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Slovak Republic 0 0 129 0 0 0 0 129
Slovenia 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
South Africa 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 121
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 104 104
Tanzania 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 83
Thailand 0 0 0 422 0 0 0 422
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 101
Tunisia 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 52
Turkey 0 0 150 0 0 0 0 150
Uganda 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 137
Ukraine 0 0 225 0 0 0 0 225
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 102 102
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Venezuela. RB 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Zambia 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 84
Zimbabwe 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 129
Total 1,524 154 2,429 923 363 1,985 807 8,185
